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Mending a Monumental Mountain: 
Resolving Two Critical Circuit Splits Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act for the Sake of 
Logic, Unity, and the Mentally Disabled 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to Mount ADA. Now please picture yourself in a 
group of fifty hikers on this large and diverse mountain.1 You have a 
guide that is responsible for leading you and your colleagues along 
the tricky trails and over the rocky terrain. A number of hikers in 
your group—ten to be exact2—need special assistance in order to 
successfully navigate the mountain, and the guide has provided them 
with the necessary accommodations. As you make your way along 
the mountain’s paths, you encounter some difficulties. You feel 
weighed down by unhappy thoughts, and, as a result, your 
relationship with your guide deteriorates. In fact, your melancholic 
mood makes it difficult to communicate and work with most of the 
people in the group. The guide considers you to be substantially 
limited in your ability to interact with others and questions your 
capability to continue the hike. You, however, feel confident in your 
abilities to perform the necessary tasks involved with the hike—
provided that the guide relieves you of duties that require significant 
interaction with the other hikers. What should be done? Must the 
guide provide the accommodations necessary for you to remain with 
the group? Can she send you packing?3
 1. This thinly veiled parable illustrates some of the major issues and challenges in the 
employment arena under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
 2. This number is representative of the datum from the United States Census Bureau, 
which states that about one in five U.S. residents suffer from at least one disability. U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, FACTS FOR FEATURES (2003), http://www.census.gov/Press-
Release/www/2003/cb03ff-10.html. Additionally, only about thirty percent of individuals 
suffering from a major disability are currently working. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS): PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, http://www.dol.gov/dolfaq/ 
go-dol-faq.asp?faqid=66&faqsub=Statistics&faqtop=People+with+Disabilities&topicid. 
 3. Before answering such questions, it is important for one to consider not only the 
point of view of the mentally impaired hiker, but also that of the guide and other hikers on the 
mountain. John Erskine wrote, “[T]he body travels more easily than the mind, and until we 
have limbered up our imagination we continue to think as though we had stayed home. We 
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In the context of the workplace environment, the answers to 
these and other questions are to be found by looking to the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990.4 Congress enacted 
the ADA in an attempt to provide comprehensive protection against 
discrimination for individuals with real or perceived disabilities. Title 
I of the ADA states that employers are prohibited from 
discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in all 
facets of employment.5 In addition to the requirement of equal 
treatment, the ADA requires employers “to make ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ or adjustments in the workplace not offered to 
applicants or employees without disabilities, which permit the person 
with a disability to perform the essential functions of his or her job.”6 
Thus, an employer that is subject to the requirements of the ADA is 
prohibited from discriminating against qualified individuals with 
disabilities and is required to provide reasonable accommodations 
that do not amount to an undue hardship.7
The courts’ application of Title I of the ADA has, at times, been 
considerably inconsistent.8 One significant fissure in the ADA 
mountain involves the question of whether an individual’s ability to 
interact with others is a major life activity under the ADA.9 This is an 
important issue because unless an individual is substantially limited in 
a major life activity (i.e., seeing, hearing, or walking), that individual 
does not qualify as disabled under the ADA, and an employer has no 
have not really budged a step until we take up residence in someone else’s point of view.” 
JOHN ERSKINE, THE COMPLETE LIFE 192 (1943). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 5. See id. § 12112(a). 
 6. Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the Legal 
and Practical Issues of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 230 (1999); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
 7. Undue hardship is defined as “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, 
when considered in light of . . . the nature and cost of the accommodation[,] . . . the overall 
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved[,] . . . the overall financial resources of 
the covered entity[, and] . . . the type of operation or operations of the covered entity.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12111. 
 8. Some even view the current ADA employment landscape as warranting action by the 
mountain’s creator—Congress. In 2004 the National Council on Disability (NCD) published a 
report entitled Righting the ADA, in which the NCD analyzed “problematic rulings” involving 
the ADA and offered suggestions for legislative action that would “restore the ADA to its 
original intent.” THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 1 (2004), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/righting_ada.htm. 
 9. “Interacting with others” refers precisely to one’s ability to communicate and 
interact with others. 
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responsibility to accommodate that individual.10 Although most 
circuits have not directly addressed this issue, the First Circuit and 
the Ninth Circuit have come to different conclusions, creating the 
“interacting with others divide.”11 In August 2005, the Eleventh 
Circuit expanded another critical divide when it rejected the 
precedent of four sister circuits and joined the First, Third, and 
Tenth Circuits in holding that the ADA requires employers to 
reasonably accommodate those employees they perceive as 
disabled.12 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision deepened what one might 
call the “accommodation divide.” This split in authority is significant 
because a mentally impaired individual will often base his 
discrimination claim on the fact that the employer perceived him as 
disabled, and if a court does not recognize a duty to accommodate 
such an individual, that person has no recourse under the ADA. 
These two splits in authority impact a significant number of 
discrimination claims and have created considerable confusion in the 
employment arena.13 The Supreme Court should quickly act to 
resolve these disputes and should do so by looking to the plain 
language of the ADA, congressional intent, Supreme Court 
precedent, and explicit guidance from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). If and when the Court 
engages in this analysis, the Court should hold that interacting with 
others is a major life activity and that employers are responsible to 
accommodate those individuals they perceive as disabled. Such 
holdings represent the most logical interpretation of the ADA and 
will create a desirable unity among the lower courts. Perhaps most 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 11. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the ability to interact with others is a “skill to be prized” but should not be recognized as a 
“major life activity” for purposes of the ADA). But see McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 
F.3d 1226, 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing the ability to get along with others as a 
“major life activity” under the ADA). Further, both the Eighth and Fourth Circuits have 
expressed doubt as to whether the ability to interact with others is a major life activity. See 
Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999); Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 
F.3d 95, 101 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 12. See D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2005). See infra 
Parts III and IV for a discussion of this circuit split. 
 13. “Recent EEOC data show more discrimination cases involve mental impairments 
(more than 20 percent) than any other disabilities category . . . .” Lyda Phillips, Employment 
Discrimination—Disability: Accommodating the Problem Employee: No Easy Answers, Experts 
and Courts Agree, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2275 (2004). 
 
5CANNON.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 11:27:40 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
532 
 
important, such a course of action is critical for the liberation and 
protection of many individuals suffering from mental illness. 
The “interacting with others” and “accommodation” divides 
impact individuals suffering from mental impairments14 more than 
any other segment of the disabled community. This is due to the 
following: an individual must have a disability to be protected under 
the ADA, and whether an individual has a disability hinges on 
whether that person is substantially limited in a major life activity. 
Unlike their physically disabled counterparts who have disabilities 
that involve limitations in major life activities such as seeing, hearing, 
speaking, or walking, individuals with mental impairments are often 
left to argue that their limitation lies with their inability to interact 
with others. Therefore, unless a court recognizes interacting with 
others as a major life activity, many mentally impaired individuals will 
not be “disabled” as defined by the ADA and will remain 
unprotected under the Act. Courts that refuse to recognize 
interacting with others as a major life activity unjustly discriminate 
against the mentally impaired. This occurs simply because their 
impairment is lesser known and their limitations are less apparent. 
Even if a court recognizes interacting with others as a major life 
activity, many mentally impaired individuals will still fall outside the 
protections of the ADA because such employees are forced to allege 
discrimination based on a “perceived disability”; and, as mentioned 
above, about half of the circuits do not require employers to 
reasonably accommodate individuals “perceived” as disabled. 
Consequently, a mentally impaired individual that qualifies as 
“disabled” due to the fact that he is perceived as substantially limited 
in his ability to interact with others is still denied the right to a 
reasonable accommodation that would allow this individual to secure 
a job or continue to work. 
Part II of this Comment provides some background on the 
framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act, focusing on those 
sections of the Act pertinent to this Comment. Part III analyzes the 
circuit splits: first, it looks at the leading case on each side of the 
“interacting with others divide”; and second, it looks at some of the 
major cases representing the “accommodation divide.” This 
 14. Mental impairments include anxiety disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, and 
schizophrenia. Of the discrimination claims that involve mental impairments, anxiety disorder 
is the most common, followed by depression. Id. 
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discussion illustrates both the importance of a unified rule and 
provides the necessary background to understanding the impact of 
these issues on persons suffering from mental impairments. Part IV 
argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit splits by 
recognizing the interaction with others as a major life activity and 
recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate 
individuals with perceived disabilities. Such holdings are entirely 
consistent with the text and purpose of the ADA and, as Part IV 
illustrates, are critical to the protection of persons suffering from 
mental impairments. However, even if the Court resolves the splits as 
suggested, Part IV shows that the realities of the present work 
environment are such that many mentally disabled individuals will 
not be protected under the current rubric of the ADA. Nevertheless, 
there appear to be additional things that can be done to help bring 
Congress’s goal of a discrimination-free work environment closer to 
a reality. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act after finding 
that some forty-three million Americans had one or more physical or 
mental disabilities15 and that discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continued in areas such as employment, public 
accommodations, education, housing, transportation, 
communication, health services, and recreation.16 In an attempt to 
cure this “serious and pervasive social problem,”17 Congress enacted 
this legislation to “provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities” and to “provide clear strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”18 Although the ADA was the first piece of 
legislation to provide comprehensive protection for the disabled,19 it 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2000). Congress’s inclusion of this figure has recently 
come under fire by the disabled community due to the Supreme Court’s usage of the figure to 
justify its conclusion that Congress desired a narrow interpretation of “disability.” See 
Disability Agency Urges Congress To ‘Right’ ADA Through Legislation, 73 U.S. L. WK. 2326 
(2004). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). 
 17. Id. § 12101(a)(2). 
 18. Id. § 12101(b)(1)–(2). 
 19. Goddard, supra note 6, at 228. 
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was not the first significant disability legislation. The Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 prohibited federally funded programs or activities from 
discriminating against the disabled.20 The Rehabilitation Act had a 
noteworthy impact on the ADA21—indeed the ADA incorporated 
some of the Rehabilitation Act’s primary definitions nearly word-for-
word.22 This is significant because the Supreme Court interpreted 
many of the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act that were eventually 
incorporated into the ADA. 
Title I of the ADA covers employment discrimination.23 It 
“applies to all private employers who have employed fifteen or more 
employees for a minimum of twenty calendar weeks within the 
current or preceding calendar year.”24 Title I applies to state and 
local governments, employment agencies, and labor unions.25 Most 
courts recognize that an individual makes out a prima facie 
discrimination case under Title I by showing four things: (1) the 
individual’s employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the individual 
suffers from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) the 
individual could perform the essential function of the job with or 
without reasonable accommodation; and (4) the individual suffered 
adverse employment action because of the disability.26 These steps 
may appear on their face to be clear, but the interpretations of the 
ADA have been far from lucid. To better understand the issues 
underlying the two circuit splits and their impact on the mentally 
disabled, the following Sections examine some of the ADA’s key 
terminology and definitions. 
 20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). 
 21. For more on the Rehabilitation Act and its influence on the ADA, see Timothy J. 
McFarlin, If They Ask for a Stool . . . Recognizing Reasonable Accommodation for Employees 
“Regarded as” Disabled, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 927 (2005). 
 22. Most notably—at least for purposes of this Comment—is the ADA’s near word-for-
word adoption of the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “handicapped individual,” which as 
amended read: “[A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially 
limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, 
or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also 
Rehabilitation Act, 87 Stat. at 361. 
 23. Because this Comment deals exclusively with employment discrimination, it is only 
necessary to discuss Title I of the ADA—the sole Title covering employment issues. 
 24. Nancy L. Abell et al., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Rights, Responsibilities, 
and Recent Results, A.L.I.-A.B.A., Sept. 19, 2000, at 249; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(a) 
(2000). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
 26. See, e.g., Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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A. “Disability” Under the ADA 
Congress defined “disability” in the ADA as “(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”27 Thus, an 
individual qualifies as disabled under the ADA in any one of three 
ways: (1) having a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities;28 (2) having a record of a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities;29 or (3) being regarded as having a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.30 An individual is disabled for purposes of the ADA if that 
individual falls under any one of the three definitions.31 Embedded 
within these definitions are numerous terms of art—“physical or 
mental impairment,” “substantially limits,” and “major life 
activities.” The outcome of many cases hinges on the court’s 
interpretation of these terms, and the following discussion contains a 
brief analysis of these terms. Because the circuit splits are primarily 
dealing with individuals asserting discrimination based on perceived 
disabilities, a deeper analysis of the third disability definition—
“regarded as” disabled—will follow the analysis of the key terms.  
1. Physical or mental impairment 
At the heart of the disability definitions lies the phrase “physical 
and mental impairment.”32 The EEOC defines physical impairment 
as “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
 28. Courts describe this as the “actual disability” definition. See, e.g., Williams v. Phila. 
Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 762–66 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 
1725 (2005). 
 29. Courts refer to this as the “disability of record” definition. 
 30. Courts deem this the “regarded as disabled” definition. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 31. See, e.g., id. Due to the complexity involved in answering the question of whether an 
individual is protected under the ADA and because the focus of this Comment involves 
questions regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship, a thorough analysis of 
this topic is not feasible. For a more detailed analysis of whether an individual is protected 
under the ADA, see Abell, supra note 24. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
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following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense 
organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, 
and endocrine.”33 Mental impairment is defined as “[a]ny mental or 
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities.”34 Courts have construed the disability definition to 
protect individuals with a wide range of disabilities spanning from 
heart conditions, high blood pressure, AIDS, epilepsy, and diabetes, 
to hearing, speech and mobility impairment, and back problems.35 
Individuals with temporary, short-term injuries or illnesses are not 
covered.36 Also, “impairments” excluded from coverage include 
recreational drug use, homosexuality and bisexuality, compulsive 
gambling, kleptomania, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, 
and voyeurism.37 In 1997 the EEOC issued guidelines designed to 
facilitate the full enforcement of the ADA with respect to individuals 
alleging employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability.38 
This EEOC report shows how the issue of psychiatric disabilities in 
the workplace has been, and continues to be, a complicated issue 
that affects a significant number of people. Proving that an individual 
is physically or mentally impaired is alone insufficient for that person 
to be protected under the Act. One must also show that the 
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 
2. Major life activities 
Before an impairment can rise to the level of a disability, a court 
must determine that the impairment substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.39 The ADA does not provide a definition of what 
 33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2004). 
 34. Id. § 1630.2(h)(2). 
 35. Abell, supra note 24, at 252. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 12211. These “impairments” are obviously not considered as such for 
large segments of society, as evidenced by their exclusion from the statute. 
 38. 3 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW 
AND REGULATIONS § 73:6 (1997) [hereinafter GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW]. In addition to 
its purpose of facilitating full enforcement, the EEOC published the guidelines to “respond to 
questions and concerns expressed by individuals with psychiatric disabilities regarding the 
ADA; and answer questions posed by employers about how principles of the ADA analysis 
apply in the context of psychiatric disabilities.” Id. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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constitutes a major life activity. Consequently, courts have had the 
final say on which life activities are “major” under the ADA. The 
EEOC has provided guidance and regulations in an attempt to direct 
courts in this area of law.40 EEOC regulations initially provided the 
following nonexhaustive list of major life activities: caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, 
breathing, learning, and working.41 In 1997 the EEOC published an 
enforcement guidance that added thinking, concentrating, and 
interacting with others to the nonexhaustive list of major life 
activities.42 Although courts disagree as to the level of recognition 
that is to be given to these latter activities, they have also expanded 
the list to include the activities of reproduction, sleeping, and sexual 
relations.43 The Supreme Court provided a little insight into its 
reasoning concerning what activities might qualify as “major” for 
purposes of the ADA in Bragdon v. Abbott. The Court noted that 
“the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion under the 
statutory rubric [of the ADA] is its significance.”44 In the 2002 case 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the 
Supreme Court found that a major life activity must be “central to 
daily life.”45 Similar to Abbott, “this language in Toyota fails to set 
forth a clear standard for the lower courts to apply in determining 
whether a particular activity is major for the purposes of the ADA.”46
3. Substantially limits 
The last hurdle in the process of proving disability is a finding 
that the impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity.47 In 
determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 
activity, courts look at the nature and severity of the impairment and 
 40. “The formal regulations (regulations), which have been officially promulgated by 
the EEOC, are entitled to great deference while the informal guidelines (guidelines or 
guidance) represent unofficial statements that are not binding on courts.” Mark DeLoach, 
Can’t We All Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a Major Life 
Activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1321 (2004).  
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2004). 
 42. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6(3). 
 43. See Abbott, 524 U.S. at 624 (recognizing reproduction as a major life activity). 
 44. Id. at 638. 
 45. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
 46. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1324. 
 47. See GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. 
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the duration or expected duration of the impairment.48 Courts have 
also evaluated the permanent or long term impact of the impairment. 
“The determination that a particular individual has a substantially 
limiting impairment should be based on information about how the 
impairment affects that individual and not on generalizations about 
the condition.”49 In the 1999 case Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
the Supreme Court held that courts must consider mitigating factors 
when deciding if the impairment is a substantial limitation.50 
Therefore, post-Sutton plaintiffs who mitigate their impairments may 
find themselves unshielded from discriminatory actions because they 
will not be considered “disabled” under the ADA. The Sutton 
decision “raised the bar for claims under all three [parts of] the 
disability definition”51 and has far-reaching effects on medicated 
persons suffering from psychiatric impairments. 
4. Perceived disabilities 
When an employer perceives an employee as disabled, as having a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities, that employee is “regarded as disabled.” 
Employees can fall under the “regarded as disabled” disability 
definition in three circumstances: 
[The individual] (1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that 
does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a 
covered entity as constituting such limitation; 
(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others 
towards such impairment; or 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475, 481–83 (1999) (holding that 
plaintiffs were not substantially limited by their poor eyesight because corrective measures gave 
them twenty-twenty vision). 
 51. Michael D. Reisman, Note, Traveling “to the Farthest Reaches of the ADA,” or 
Taking Aim at Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Perceived Disability?, 26 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2121, 2135 (2005). 
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(3) [h]as none of the impairments defined in [this regulation] but 
is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting 
impairment.52
This language shows that the “regarded as” definition of disability 
focuses on the “perceptions about the individual, not the individual’s 
actual condition.”53 By focusing on the perception of others, the 
third prong recognizes “that society’s accumulated myths and fears 
about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical 
limitations that flow from actual impairment.”54 This definition 
functions to punish employers that take discriminatory action against 
the disabled, or those they perceive as disabled, and also strikes at the 
discriminatory attitudes that thwart an individual’s ability to work.55 
“These three categories should be seen as a guide to recognizing 
that employer misperceptions can result in discrimination in a variety 
of circumstances, and courts have used them to this end.”56
B. Qualified Individual and Reasonable Accommodation 
In addition to having a recognized disability under the ADA, an 
individual who seeks protection under the Act must be qualified for 
the job at issue.57 A “qualified individual”58 under the ADA is a 
person with a disability who can perform the essential function of the 
employment position that such person occupies, or desires to 
occupy, with or without reasonable accommodation.59 If such a 
person cannot perform the essential functions of the position at 
 52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) (2004). 
 53. Reisman, supra note 51, at 2127–28 (“[C]laims ‘regarded as disabled in the major 
life activity of working’ should be the primary, if not exclusive, basis for membership in the 
ADA’s protected class for individuals with less visible impairments.”). 
 54. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). Congress 
pointed to the Arline decision as explaining the proper purpose of the “regarded as” prong 
and “adopted the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ‘regarded as’ definition (under the Rehab 
Act) in introducing the ADA.” McFarlin, supra note 21, at 942; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-
485 (III), at 453 (1990). 
 55. McFarlin, supra note 21, at 943. 
 56. Id. at 940. 
 57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2000). 
 58. For a comprehensive discussion of the question of who is a “qualified individual” for 
purposes of Title I of the ADA, see William H. Danne, Annotation, Who Is “Qualified 
Individual” Under Americans with Disabilities Act Provisions Defining, and Extending 
Protection Against Employment Discrimination to Qualified Individual with Disability, 146 
A.L.R. FED. 1 (1998). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
5CANNON.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 11:27:40 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
540 
 
issue, the employer need not hire or retain that person.60 The 
EEOC, through a promulgated regulation, defines a qualified 
individual with a disability as “an individual with a disability who 
satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-
related requirements of the employment position such individual 
holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such 
position.”61 Embedded in this definition is a two-step analysis that 
courts have consistently followed to determine whether individuals 
are qualified under the ADA:62
Consistent with the approach embodied in an [EEOC] regulation 
(29 C.F.R. §1630.29(m)), the courts have engaged in a 
fundamental 2-step analysis in resolving whether one is a qualified 
individual with a disability under ADA Title I, the first step is to 
determine if the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the 
position, such as possessing the appropriate educational 
background, employment experience, skills, licenses, and the like, 
and the second step is to determine whether the individual can 
perform the essential functions of the position, with or without 
reasonable accommodation.63
A court makes the determination of an employee’s “qualified” status 
under the ADA at the time of the adverse employment action.64 The 
EEOC defines essential functions as “the fundamental job duties of 
the employment position the individual with a disability holds or 
 60. Id. § 12112. 
 61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2004). 
 62. See, e.g., Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S. Ct. 746 (2005) (recognizing that courts employ a two-part inquiry when 
determining whether a person is a qualified individual under the ADA, looking first to whether 
the employee satisfied the employer’s legitimate selection criteria for the position, and then 
looking to whether the employee was capable, with or without accommodation, of performing 
the job’s essential functions); Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that an employee establishes the “qualified individual” element by satisfying the 
requisite job-related requirements of the position and performing the essential functions of the 
position, with or without reasonable accommodation); Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., 
Inc., 209 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the examination of an employee’s “qualified” 
status involves asking whether the employee could perform the essential functions of the job, 
and if not, whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable him to 
perform those functions). 
 63. Danne, supra note 58, § 2(a). 
 64. Id. § 5(a) (citing Morton v. GTE North Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 
1996)). 
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desires.”65 The ADA requires that courts consider the employer’s 
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.66 The qualified 
individual analysis is especially pertinent for people with mental 
disabilities because interacting with others is often an essential 
function of the job. The question then becomes whether there is an 
accommodation that would enable a mentally impaired person to be 
able to interact with others. 
Employers under the ADA have an affirmative duty to reasonably 
accommodate “otherwise qualified individual[s]” so that these 
individuals can perform the essential functions of their employment 
positions.67 The ADA defines reasonable accommodation by 
providing possible examples: 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations 
for individuals with disabilities.68
The EEOC has stressed that employers should initiate an informal 
and interactive process with the disabled individual to “identify the 
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential 
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those 
limitations.”69 However, the ADA does not require employers to 
accommodate such individuals if such accommodation would result 
in an undue hardship. The ADA defines an undue hardship as “an 
action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in 
light of . . . the nature and cost of the accommodation . . . the 
overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved . . . the 
overall financial resources of the covered entity . . . [and] the type of 
operation or operations of the covered entity.”70
 65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). 
 67. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 68. Id. § 12111(9). 
 69. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A)–(B). 
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C. The EEOC 
To fully analyze the circuit splits, and to really engage in any 
serious employment law discussion, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
some of its actions pertaining to the mentally impaired. Congress has 
given the EEOC the primary responsibility of enforcing the 
employment-related portions of the ADA.71 In 1997 the EEOC 
published enforcement guidelines designed to “facilitate the full 
enforcement of the ADA with respect to individuals alleging 
employment discrimination based on psychiatric disability.”72 Among 
the notable elements of this guidance were the EEOC’s additions to 
the list of major life activities. In addition to the list of enumerated 
activities in the ADA, the EEOC added the life activities of 
“learning, thinking, concentrating, [and] interacting with others.”73 
The EEOC qualified this latter activity in a footnote where it stated 
that “[i]nteracting with others, as a major life activity, is not 
substantially limited just because an individual is irritable or has some 
trouble getting along with a supervisor or coworker.”74 Despite this 
limiting language, the EEOC suggests an expansion from the 
traditional scope of major life activities. 
Due to the structure of the ADA disability definition, many 
people that might be considered disabled in a colloquial sense would 
not qualify as disabled under the ADA. Clearly, individuals suffering 
from a mental impairment face challenges and discrimination equal 
to that which their physically impaired brothers and sisters face. 
However, unless courts recognize “interacting with others” as a 
major life activity, the mentally impaired may face the discrimination 
without the protection of the ADA. 
III. EXPLORING THE DIVIDES 
This Part describes the current state of the law as affected by the 
circuit splits; namely, the split in authority involving some courts’ 
recognition of interacting with others as a major life activity and the 
courts’ recognition of an employer’s duty to reasonably 
 71. Other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs, also have responsibilities under those segments of the law.  
 72. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. § 73:6 n.15. 
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accommodate those perceived as disabled. To best explain this 
division, the following Sections look at the leading cases on each side 
of the “interacting with others” and “accommodation” divides. This 
discussion illustrates the importance of a unified rule and provides 
the background necessary to understand the impact of these issues 
on persons suffering from mental impairments. 
A. The Interacting with Others Divide 
The First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have both directly 
addressed the question of whether one’s interaction with others is a 
major life activity for purposes of the ADA. Their conflicting 
holdings have created the interacting-with-others divide—a divide 
that left unattended will certainly grow deeper. This Section analyzes 
these two leading cases to sharpen the focus of this debate and to set 
the stage for a discussion of whose interpretation is correct.75 The 
First Circuit, in Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., did not recognize 
the ability to interact with others as a major life activity.76 In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit, in McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 
held that interacting with others is a major life activity for purposes 
of the ADA.77  
1. Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc. 
In January 1997, the First Circuit heard Soileau v. Guilford of 
Maine, Inc. and refused to recognize the “ability to get along with 
others” as a major life activity.78 The court found the concept to be 
unworkable as a definition and different in kind to the more 
generally recognized major life activities of walking and breathing.79
Randall Soileau began working for Guilford in 1979.80 In 1992 
Soileau started working for Earnest, a new supervisor, but the 
ensuing relationship between Soileau and Earnest deteriorated.81 A 
dispute subsequently arose between Earnest and Soileau when 
 75. See discussion infra Part IV (including an analysis of “who got it right”). 
 76. 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).  
 77. 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 78. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 12. This case was decided prior to the release of the 1997 
EEOC enforcement guidance referenced infra Part II.C. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 13. 
 81. Id. 
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Soileau refused to train a coworker as directed by Earnest.82 The next 
day Earnest issued Soileau a “Final Written Warning/Suspension” 
that “listed four performance deficiencies, ordered a two day 
suspension, and required Soileau to evaluate his own performance 
and come back with an improvement plan.”83 Stressed by the final 
warning, Soileau told Earnest of his previous suicidal state and that 
he was afraid he might once again be falling ill. This was the first 
time Earnest had heard of Soileau’s condition.84 Soileau went to see 
a psychologist a week later.85 The doctor diagnosed Soileau as 
suffering from a bout of depression. Soileau told Earnest that he was 
having a difficult time interacting with other people and Earnest 
agreed that Soileau would be temporarily relieved from certain duties 
that aggravated his illness.86
On April 12, the doctor provided Guilford with a letter that 
requested Soileau’s duties to be “restricted so as to avoid 
responsibilities which require[d] significant interaction with other 
employees.”87 On April 21, Earnest and Soileau met to discuss 
Soileau’s employment situation. Earnest indicated that he believed 
the new accommodations satisfied the doctor’s recommendations.88 
However, because Soileau had failed to provide Earnest with an 
improvement plan as requested in the warning, Earnest fired Soileau 
a day later. Earnest informed Soileau that he had been fired as a 
result of his lack of improvement in the four problem areas and 
because he failed to submit an improvement plan.89
Soileau filed an ADA discrimination claim in federal court against 
Guilford arguing that he was significantly limited in the major life 
activity of interacting with others.90 The district court granted 
summary judgment for Guilford and held, among other things, that 
Soileau’s dysthemia did not substantially impair a major life activity. 
Reviewing the case de novo, the First Circuit found that Soileau had 
a mental impairment but refused to recognize the inability to work 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 14. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
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with others as impairing a major life activity.91 Therefore, Soileau was 
not “disabled” under the ADA because he failed to show that his 
impairment substantially limited a major life activity. 
The court noted that the “concept of ‘ability to get along with 
others’ is remarkably elastic, perhaps so much so as to make it 
unworkable as a definition.”92 Moreover, even if courts recognized 
the ability to interact with others as a major life activity, Soileau was 
not sufficiently limited because the two documented bouts of 
depression occurred at times when most people would feel stress—
following a break-up with a girlfriend and criticism from a 
supervisor.93 The court described the ability to get along with others 
as a “skill to be prized . . . [but] different in kind from breathing or 
walking.”94 However, “a more narrowly defined concept going to 
essential attributes of human communication could, in a particular 
setting, be understood to be a major life activity.” Nevertheless, the 
court saw no need to address this question in its opinion95 and felt 
uncomfortable imposing duties on employers for an “amorphous” 
concept.96
Two years after the Soileau decision, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
the question of whether interacting with others is major life activity 
under the ADA, and it came to a different conclusion than the First 
Circuit. 
2. McAlindin v. County of San Diego 
In 1999 the Ninth Circuit decided McAlindin v. County of San 
Diego and held that interacting with others is a major life activity 
because it is a significant activity that the average person can perform 
with little or no difficulty.97
Richard McAlindin worked for the County of San Diego’s 
Housing and Community Development Department for more than 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. The court found that “Soileau’s alleged inability to interact with others came 
and went and was triggered by vicissitudes of life which are normally stressful for ordinary 
people—losing a girlfriend or being criticized by a supervisor.” Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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ten years.98 McAlindin suffered from and received treatment for 
anxiety disorders, panic disorders, and somatoform disorders.99 In 
early 1989, McAlindin was promoted and took on various stressful 
duties.100 During a meeting with his supervisor, McAlindin allegedly 
became agitated and shouted in an accusatory manner. He was 
granted leave due to “work stress” and, as a result, obtained workers 
compensation.101 In May 1992, McAlindin again took leave for 
stress-related disability, during which time “he repeatedly requested 
through his attorney a transfer to a different job as a ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ required by the ADA.”102 The County agreed to 
place his name on the transfer list but would not make special efforts 
to guarantee a transfer.103
At the request of the County, McAlindin visited another doctor 
in the summer of 1993 who also diagnosed him with anxiety and 
panic disorders but felt that he could return to his job in three to six 
weeks with proper treatment.104 When McAlindin returned to work, 
he felt that his supervisors treated him drastically worse. A supervisor 
gave McAlindin a written warning for sleeping at work despite his 
explanation that his prescribed medications made him drowsy.105 
Additionally, McAlindin complained about “not receiving adequate 
training to help him adapt to the changing technologies in the 
department.”106 Though he retained his position, McAlindin filed an 
ADA discrimination claim against the County and his supervisors, 
and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
County.107 Although the district court found that McAlindin had a 
mental impairment, it concluded that he was not substantially 
limited in any major life activity.108 The Ninth Circuit reversed.109
Although McAlindin had not specifically alleged disability based 
on his limited ability to interact with others, the Ninth Circuit found 
 98. Id. at 1231. 
 99. Id. at 1230. 
 100. Id. at 1231. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1233. 
 109. Id. at 1240. 
5CANNON.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 11:27:40 AM 
529] Mending a Monumental Mountain 
 547 
 
enough evidence to support such a conclusion and further held that 
interacting with others is a major life activity under the ADA.110 As 
support for its holding, the court pointed to Supreme Court and 
other circuit precedent as well as to the 1997 EEOC Enforcement 
Guidance concerning psychiatric disabilities.111 The Ninth Circuit 
noted that in Bragdon v. Abbott the Supreme Court found that the 
term “major life activity” was very broad and denoted “comparative 
importance,” suggesting that “the touchstone for determining an 
activity’s inclusion under the [ADA] rubric is its significance.”112 The 
court also noted that the Tenth Circuit supported a broad definition 
of “major life activity” in its decision Pack v. Kmart, Inc.,113 where it 
held that “a major life activity also must be ‘a basic activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform with little or 
no difficulty.’”114
The Ninth Circuit found “interacting with others” to fit 
comfortably within the Act’s broad definition of major life activity. It 
viewed interacting with others as “an essential, regular function, like 
walking and breathing.”115 The court dismissed the First Circuit’s 
concern that the “ability to get along with others” was too vague by 
noting that the ADA text contained nothing about vagueness as a 
test for determining “major life activities.”116 Moreover, the court 
believed interacting with others to be no vaguer than “caring for 
oneself.”117 The Ninth Circuit did stipulate, however, that “a plaintiff 
must show that his ‘relations with others were characterized on a 
regular basis by severe problems, for example, consistently high levels 
of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to communicate when 
necessary.’”118
Before analyzing which of these two cases was decided correctly, 
an exploration of the accommodation divide is in order.  
 110. Id. at 1233–35. 
 111. Id. at 1233. 
 112. Id. (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998)). 
 113. Pack v. Kmart, Inc., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 114. McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Pack, 166 F.3d at 1305). 
 115. Id. at 1234. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1235 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had defined caring for oneself as including 
“everything from driving and grooming to feeding oneself and cleaning one’s home”). 
 118. Id. 
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B. The Accommodation Divide 
Most circuit courts have directly addressed the question of 
whether an employer is required to reasonably accommodate those 
individuals perceived as disabled. Currently, there is a four-four 
split—the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that an 
employee perceived as disabled is not entitled to reasonable 
accommodation,119 and the First, Third, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits hold that such individuals are entitled to reasonable 
accommodation.120 The following cases illustrate the arguments for 
both sides of the debate. 
1. Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas 
First, consider an illustrative case in which the Ninth Circuit held 
that perceived disability does not amount to protection under the 
ADA in the form of reasonable accommodations. In Kaplan, a peace 
officer brought suit under the ADA alleging discrimination by the 
city when it fired him because of a perceived disability.121 Although 
the peace officer successfully proved that he was regarded as disabled 
for purposes of the ADA, the court concluded that he was not 
entitled to a reasonable accommodation for his perceived disability 
because of the pervasive and troubling results associated with 
accommodating individuals with perceived disabilities.122
In 1989 the City of North Las Vegas hired Frederick Kaplan as a 
peace officer.123 In 1995 Kaplan injured his right wrist and thumb 
during a defensive tactics training exercise.124 During rehabilitation, 
Kaplan complained of pain in his right hand when holding objects.125 
 119. See Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231–33 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 
F.3d 907, 916–18 (8th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th 
Cir. 1998). 
 120. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005); D’Angelo v. 
ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1236–39 (11th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Phila. Hous. 
Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772–76 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1725 
(2005); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996) (assuming, but not expressly 
holding, that employers are required to reasonably accommodate employees regarded as 
disabled). 
 121. 323 F.3d at 1227. 
 122. Id. at 1232–33.  
 123. Id. at 1227. 
 124. Id. at 1228. 
 125. Id. 
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Despite numerous therapy sessions, Kaplan continued to experience 
significant pain. Dr. Mark Reed concluded that Kaplan had 
rheumatoid arthritis and recommended “a full duty work release, 
with his employer to evaluate his ability to handle a gun.”126 Shortly 
thereafter, Kaplan met with Dr. Timothy Deneau who determined 
that Kaplan’s rheumatoid arthritis condition was permanent.127 Dr. 
Deneau informed the office that Kaplan could not perform the 
essential function of his job as a peace officer.128 Although Kaplan 
requested an opportunity to qualify at the gun range—a necessary 
activity to remain on the job—the deputy chief denied his request.129 
Kaplan was terminated later that day.130
Less than a week after his termination, and on his own initiative, 
Kaplan qualified on the gun range but did not request 
reinstatement.131 Kaplan later testified that it was not until years later 
that he recovered the ability to perform the actions that would 
constitute his former essential job functions.132 Two years later, “an 
independent physician retained by the City determined that Kaplan 
never suffered from rheumatoid arthritis.”133 Kaplan filed a complaint 
in federal court.134  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit had to resolve two issues to 
determine whether Kaplan was a “qualified individual” under the 
ADA: “(1) whether Kaplan was able to perform the essential 
function of the peace officer position at the time of his termination 
without an accommodation, and (2) whether Kaplan was entitled to 
reasonable accommodation to help him perform the essential job 
functions of a peace officer.”135 The court quickly concluded that at 
the time of his termination Kaplan could not perform the essential 
job function of a peace officer without accommodation.136 Because 
Kaplan was asserting a perceived disability claim, the court concluded 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1228–29. 
 128. Id. at 1228. 
 129. Id. at 1229. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1230; see supra Part II.B. 
 136. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1230–31. 
5CANNON.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 11:27:40 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
550 
 
that he was not entitled to reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.137
Although the Kaplan court looked first to the plain language of 
the statute, it was not convinced that a clear answer to the 
accommodation question was available. Notably, the court said that 
the absence of a stated distinction between the three alternative parts 
of the “disability” definition was “not tantamount to an explicit 
instruction by Congress that ‘regarded as’ individuals are entitled to 
reasonable accommodation[].”138 Also, the court argued that a 
“formalistic reading of the ADA”139 would lead to bizarre results.140 
The court looked beyond the plain language of the statute, noting 
that if it “were to conclude that ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs are entitled to 
reasonable accommodation, impaired employees would be better off 
under the statute if their employers treated them as disabled even if 
they were not.”141 The court viewed this as a “perverse and troubling 
result”142 and stated that 
[w]ere we to entitle “regarded as” employees to reasonable 
accommodation, it would do nothing to encourage those 
employees to educate employers of their capabilities, and do 
nothing to encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents 
clearly; instead, it would improvidently provide those employees a 
windfall if they perpetuated their employers’ misperception of a 
disability.143
Although most circuits recognize the fact that some strange results 
will occur when accommodating individuals with perceived 
disabilities, some circuits are not overly concerned. These 
unconcerned circuits rely on a strict interpretation of the ADA to 
hold that an employer is responsible to accommodate those 
perceived as disabled.  
 137. Id. at 1231. 
 138. Id. at 1232. 
 139. Id. While some call it formalistic, others call it accurate. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (citing Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
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2. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. 
Next, consider a case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that 
perceived disabilities do amount to protection under the ADA in the 
form of reasonable accommodations. In D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, 
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that employers are required “to 
provide reasonable accommodations for individuals they regard as 
disabled”144 because the ADA requires employers to accommodate 
the disabled and the ADA disability definition makes no distinction 
between one who is actually disabled and one perceived as disabled. 
Cris D’Angelo was diagnosed with vertigo in September 1998.145 
A doctor prescribed some antivertigo medication, but D’Angelo 
started feeling better and did not fill the prescription.146 A month 
after the diagnosis, D’Angelo began working for ConAgra. Over the 
next few years, she worked in several divisions doing various types of 
jobs.147 D’Angelo became sick only when she performed tasks that 
forced her to continuously stare at a conveyer belt.148 In September 
2001, a supervisor assigned D’Angelo to monitor the “box-former 
belt,” which required her to make sure that the boxes on the belt 
were properly formed.149 This work resulted in the resurfacing of her 
vertigo condition, and she informed her line leader that the work was 
making her sick and dizzy.150 The supervisor asked for 
“documentation” of D’Angelo’s vertigo condition.151 D’Angelo 
provided the plant manager with a letter from her doctor stating that 
she should avoid situations where she has to look at moving belts.152
The plant manager met with Singleton’s Vice President of 
Human Resources and determined that there were no available 
positions where D’Angelo could avoid working around and viewing 
moving equipment.153 D’Angelo was terminated the next day.154 
 144. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1223. 
 147. Id. at 1222. 
 148. Id. at 1223. Although her first position required her to work on a conveyer belt, 
D’Angelo’s subsequent positions rarely involved work with conveyer belts. Id. at 1222. 
 149. Id. at 1223. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 1224. 
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After failing to receive a response from a filed union grievance, 
D’Angelo filed suit against ConAgra, alleging disability-based 
discrimination due to the employer’s failure to reasonably 
accommodate her.155 She claimed protection under the ADA because 
she was both disabled and because her employer regarded her as 
disabled. A federal district court in Florida granted summary 
judgment for ConAgra after finding that D’Angelo was not actually 
disabled because her “vertigo condition did not significantly limit 
her in the major life activity of working.”156 The district court also 
denied her “regarded as” claim. 
The appellate court found that D’Angelo’s vertigo condition did 
not significantly limit her in the major life activity of work and 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against 
D’Angelo on her “actual impairment” claim.157 In analyzing 
D’Angelo’s “perceived disability” claim, the court first examined 
whether D’Angelo was a “qualified individual.”158 This analysis 
focused on whether working on a conveyer belt is an essential 
function of the position of product transporter.159 The court reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim because 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether working on 
the conveyer belt was an essential function of the job.160
In denying D’Angelo’s perceived disability claim, the district 
court based its holding on the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits, which held that plaintiffs claiming they were 
regarded as disabled were not entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA.161 Therefore, D’Angelo’s inability 
to perform her job as a transporter without an exemption from 
working on the spreader and box-former belts denied her a valid 
claim under the ADA.162 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the four sister 
circuits and followed the Third Circuit in holding that individuals 
perceived as disabled are entitled to reasonable accommodations.163 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1227. 
 158. Id. at 1229. 
 159. See id. at 1230–34. 
 160. Id. at 1234. 
 161. Id. at 1234–35. 
 162. Id. at 1234. 
 163. Id. at 1235. 
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In coming to this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit engaged in an 
appropriate analysis of statutory interpretation, beginning with—and 
ultimately relying on—an examination of the plain language of the 
ADA.164  
After quoting selected sections of the ADA, the Eleventh Circuit 
logically concluded that the “ADA bars discrimination ‘against an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position.’”165 The court then looked to the statute’s 
definition of “disability,” paying special attention to the word “or” 
that separated the three “kinds” of disabilities: “A ‘disability,’ in 
turn, is defined by the statute as either ‘a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual,’ or  ‘a record of such an impairment,’ or 
‘being regarded as having such an impairment.’”166 The court 
reasoned that when one inserts this definition into the statute’s 
prohibition, the bar on discrimination clearly applies equally to all 
statutorily defined disabilities. The court stated that “[t]he text of 
this statute simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three 
types of disabilities in determining which are entitled to a reasonable 
accommodation and which are not.”167 The court viewed the 
Supreme Court’s decision in School Board of Nassau County v. 
Arline168 as support for its interpretation of the statute.169
 164. Id. at 1225–29, 1239. 
 165. Id. at 1235. 
 166. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(C) (2000)). 
 167. Id. at 1236. 
 168. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
 169. See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236. In Arline, a Florida schoolteacher afflicted with 
tuberculosis claimed that her employer violated the 1973 Rehabilitation Act when she was 
fired because her employer regarded her as handicapped. Id. 1236 (citing Arline, 480 U.S. at 
273–74). As part of its analysis, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1973 Rehabilitation Act’s 
definition of “handicapped individual.” Id. Part of this definition, then codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
706(7)(B)(1970), read that “any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which 
substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (ii) has a record of such 
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment” qualifies as a handicapped 
individual. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1236. Based on this definition, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the schoolteacher was a handicapped individual within the “regarded as” 
definition. Id. Recognizing that employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable 
accommodation for handicapped employees, the Court remanded the case to the district court 
to determine if the school board could have reasonably accommodated the teacher. Id. The 
Supreme Court provided valuable insights into the “regarded as” definition when it stated that 
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The D’Angelo court further cited to the ADA’s legislative history 
that “expressly states that ‘[t]he ADA incorporates many of the 
standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would 
result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business.’”170 
Therefore, based on the plain language of the statute and the 
insights provided by the Arline court, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations for employees they regard as disabled.171
Just two months before the Eleventh Circuit handed down the 
D’Angelo decision, the Tenth Circuit decided Kelly v. Metallics West, 
Inc. and came to the same conclusion that the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation requirement applies to individuals regarded as 
disabled.172  
3. Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc. 
In April 1996, Beverly Kelly began working for Metallics West as 
a receptionist.173 Kelly was hospitalized in May 2000 due to a blood 
clot in her lung.174 She returned home on supplemental oxygen, and 
her physician cleared her to return to work about a week later.175 
Kelly attempted to work without oxygen but “felt short of breath, 
light-headed, and [she] had a headache.”176 She returned to her 
doctor and received a note stating that she needed to use oxygen to 
[b]y amending the definition of “handicapped individual” to include not only those 
who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired 
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress 
acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and 
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual 
impairment. . . . The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to 
actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound 
judgments: the definition of “handicapped individual” is broad, but only those 
individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief. 
Id. at 1236–37. 
 170. Id. at 1237 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 2 (1989)). 
 171. Id. at 1240. 
 172. See Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 173. Id. at 671. 
 174. Id. at 672. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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work.177 Kelly told Michael Mola, Chairman of the Board of 
Metallics West, that she needed to use oxygen in order to return to 
work.178 According to Kelly, Mola told her, “No, there will be no 
oxygen on the premises.”179 Upon filing for short term disability 
benefits, Kelly received them from June 2 to June 19, 2000.180 Her 
doctor allowed her to return to work without oxygen, but shortly 
after returning to work, she began to suffer from headaches and 
lightheadedness.181 After finding that her oxygen levels were low, the 
doctor provided her a release, clearing her to return to work with 
oxygen.182
Kelly contacted Mola on June 27 and told him that her doctor 
would only allow her to return to work if she used supplemental 
oxygen.183 Once again, Mola refused Kelly’s request to use oxygen 
and stated “that he did not want the responsibility because she might 
‘fall over dead.’”184 Later that day, Mola wrote a letter to Kelly that 
she construed as terminating her employment.185 Kelly did not return 
to work but instead brought discrimination and retaliation claims 
 177. Id. The note simply read: “Patient needs to use O2 at work.” Id. 
 178. Id. Kelly had also testified that she provided the doctor’s note to somebody at 
Metallics West, but she could not remember exactly to whom she had given the note. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. Kelly did not provide this release to Metallics West until her attorney contacted 
them one month later. Id. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 673. The letter stated: 
Relative to our conversation of this morning concerning your absen[ce]. It appears 
that your health situation the past few months has not improved. You have lost 
considerable time and your words to me this morning is [sic] that you and your 
doctor have not found the answer and you would either report to work with an 
oxygen bottle or lose more time. Either condition does not make for a stable 
employee. Based on this information, management in a meeting this morning, voted 
to hire a new replacement for your job. This job of order entry is so critical that we 
cannot do without a full time person. You will need to contact Ann or Shawn to 
arrange your Cobra Insurance payments. Bev, you have been an exceptional 
employee these past years and your professionalism and genial manner endeared you 
to all of us. You are a very special person. If and when your health improves we will 
try to work with your doctors and you for a safe return to us. As I indicated we’d try 
to find another job within our organization that fits your talent and drive. We are all 
praying for your swift and complete recovery. 
Id. 
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under the ADA against Metallics West.186 The trial court denied 
Metallics West’s motion for summary judgment and allowed the 
discrimination claim to proceed on the theory that Kelly’s employer 
had regarded her as disabled and had fired her because of this 
perceived disability.187 Metallics West moved for a judgment as a 
matter of law188 on the theory that an employee merely regarded as 
disabled by her employer is not entitled to reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA.189 The trial court denied the 
motion.190
After acknowledging the circuit split on the issue, the Tenth 
Circuit followed the reasoning of the First and Third Circuits and 
held that an employer must reasonably accommodate employees 
perceived or regarded as disabled.191 Much like the D’Angelo court, 
the Kelly court noted that “the plain language of the ADA’s 
interlocking statutory definitions includes within the rubric of a 
‘qualified individual with a disability’ protected by the ADA 
individuals (1) regarded as disabled but (2) who, with reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position 
that they hold.”192 The court looked to the plain language of the 
statute, noting that Congress “makes no distinction between 
employees who are actually disabled and those who are merely 
regarded as disabled.”193
This circuit split, just like the split involving the “interacting with 
others” question, does not happen by accident. There are strong 
arguments on each side of the splits, and thousands of educated eyes 
have looked at these issues. Therefore, in the search for logic, unity, 
and the liberation of the mentally disabled, each side must be 
thoroughly analyzed.  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. This was done pursuant to Section 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 189. Kelly, 410 F.3d at 673. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 675–76. 
 192. Id. at 675. 
 193. Id. at 676. (“Can it be inherently ‘unreasonable’ to accommodate an employee who 
is only regarded as disabled? Congress does not appear to have thought so . . . .”); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
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IV. WHO GOT IT RIGHT AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
This Part analyzes the two circuit splits and argues that the 
Supreme Court should resolve the splits by recognizing that 
interaction with others is a major life activity and by recognizing an 
employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate individuals with 
perceived disabilities. This Part then illustrates the importance of 
such holdings for individuals suffering from mental impairments that 
are making perceived disability claims. However, even if the Court 
resolves the splits as suggested, this Part shows that the realities of 
the present work environment are such that many mentally disabled 
individuals will not be protected under the current rubric of the 
ADA. Nevertheless, there are in fact additional ways to make 
Congress’s goal of a discrimination-free work environment closer to 
a reality. 
A. The “Interacting with Others” Divide 
Although many courts have hesitated to recognize “interacting 
with others” as a major life activity under the ADA,194 the Ninth 
Circuit came to the correct conclusion when it held that “interacting 
with others” is a major life activity under the ADA. Supreme Court 
precedent, the EEOC guidelines, and the overarching goals of the 
ADA all suggest such a conclusion. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should also recognize “interacting with others” as a major life 
activity. 
Supreme Court precedent provides powerful suggestions as to 
how a court should view “interaction with others” under the ADA. 
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court found that the term “major life 
activity” was very broad and denoted “comparative importance,” 
suggesting that “the touchstone for determining an activity’s 
inclusion under the [ADA] rubric is its significance.”195 More 
recently in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 
the Court noted that to be “major,” an activity must be “of central 
importance to daily life.”196 One would be hard pressed to argue that 
“interaction with others” is not of central importance to daily life. In 
 194. See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 2001); Amir v. St. 
Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 195. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). 
 196. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
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fact, when compared to the major life activities most commonly 
associated with the physically disabled—seeing, hearing, walking, 
breathing—one’s weakened ability to interact with others carries a 
comparable importance and results in a similar frustration. As much 
as an unimpaired individual would shrink from going through a 
week with limited ability to walk, see, or hear, such an individual 
would similarly shrink from the idea of experiencing a week with 
limited ability to interact with others, especially given today’s world 
of personal communication and interconnectedness.  
In addition to this Supreme Court language, the EEOC, 
through its Enforcement Guidance issued in 1997, added 
“interacting with others” to its nonexhaustive list of major life 
activities that fall under the ADA.197 This addition was clearly 
influenced by Congress’s goal to “combat . . . employment 
discrimination as well as the myths, fears, and stereotypes upon 
which it is based.”198 Congress has given the EEOC the primary 
responsibility of enforcing the employment-related portions of the 
ADA.199 The EEOC devotes countless hours to analyzing and 
preparing guidance on how to implement and interpret the ADA. 
Although the 1997 Enforcement Guidance was not a regulation and, 
therefore, is not afforded great deference, the guidance should not 
be taken lightly. One’s ability to interact with others is a significant 
activity, and one’s limitation in this activity should not be 
minimized. 
Interacting with others is a significant activity that is of central 
importance to the daily lives of most Americans. While the concept 
may be vague, the Ninth Circuit rightly recognized that “interacting 
with others” is no more vague than the “ability to care for 
oneself.”200 Furthermore, the text of the ADA contains nothing 
 197. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. The EEOC could increase 
the likelihood that the Supreme Court would recognize interacting with others as a major life 
activity by formalizing this guidance through formal rule-making procedures. As a general rule, 
courts afford a promulgated regulation greater deference than an enforcement guidance. See 
Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1558 (2005) (“Under Chevron, we will defer to a 
reasonable agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory language provided that the 
interpretation has the requisite ‘force of law.’” (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 587 (2000))).  
 198. GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. 
 199. Other Federal agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs, also have responsibilities under those segments of the law. 
 200. McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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about vagueness as a test for determining major life activities.201 
Interacting with others necessarily and naturally fits as a major life 
activity. 
The inclusion of “interacting with others” as a major life activity 
clearly creates a few challenges in its application. As one author 
noted, “it is hard[] to imagine how someone could succeed in 
today’s global, high-performance, team-oriented workplace if he 
were substantially limited in his ability to . . . interact with other 
people.”202 Moreover, in this classification more than any other, 
there is the problem of distinguishing between disabilities and 
inabilities. “There are, truth be told, people in the workplace who 
are irritable, quick tempered, cantankerous or prone to poor 
judgment. The ADA does not, however, protect people with 
obnoxious personality traits but only those who (in the case of 
mental impairments) have a mental or psychological disorder.”203
The Supreme Court should recognize “interacting with others” 
as a major life activity. Not only does precedent so dictate, but the 
liberation of many mentally impaired individuals depends on it. 
Lydia Phillips elaborated upon this and wrote, “In 2003, the World 
Health Organization estimated that mental health problems in the 
United States account for 35 percent to 45 percent of absenteesim, 
an average of six work loss days per 100 workers, and an estimated 
59 percent of the economic costs arising from injury and illness-
related loss of productivity.”204 Based on these statistics, resolving 
the split might do more than rightfully protecting the mentally 
impaired; it may be a financially sound course of action. 
B. The Accommodation Divide 
The Eleventh, Tenth, Third, and First Circuits were correct in 
holding that employers have an obligation under the ADA to 
reasonably accommodate individuals they perceive as disabled. First 
and foremost, the plain language of the ADA requiring reasonable 
accommodation makes no distinction between employees that are 
actually disabled and those merely regarded as disabled. The 
 201. Id. 
 202. Michael Starr & Megumi Sakae, Mental Disabilities, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 22, 2004, 
at 12. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Phillips, supra note 13. 
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Supreme Court has explained that a court’s first step in interpreting a 
statute is “to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the 
case.”205 The D’Angelo court correctly took a careful look at the text, 
noting that “the ADA bars discrimination ‘against an individual with 
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential function of the employment position.’”206 The 
ADA defines disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such 
individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as 
having such an impairment.”207 As has been discussed, an individual 
is “disabled” for purposes of the ADA if that individual meets any 
one of the disability definition’s three prongs.208 The D’Angelo court 
then properly inserted the definition into the statute’s prohibition. 
Only then does it become clear that the ADA bars discrimination 
“against an individual regarded as having such an impairment who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position.”209 As the Eleventh, 
Tenth, and Third Circuits noted, “the text of this statute simply 
offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities 
in determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation 
and which are not.”210
The recognition of an employer’s obligation to accommodate 
individuals perceived as disabled is not only a logical reading of the 
ADA, it is also entirely consistent with the overarching purpose of 
the Act. Congress enacted the ADA in an attempt to provide 
comprehensive protection against discrimination for individuals with 
real or perceived disabilities. The “ADA is concerned with 
safeguarding the employee’s livelihood from adverse action taken on 
the basis of ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the 
individual ability’ of the employee.”211 Moreover, the trend is 
moving towards circuits recognizing this obligation to 
 205. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). 
 206. D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 207. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
 208. See supra Part II.A. 
 209. D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1235. 
 210. Id. at 1236. 
 211. Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(a)(7)). 
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accommodate, as is evidenced by the 2005 decisions in the Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuit Courts. 
The Kaplan court also looked first to the plain language, but it 
concluded that the absence of a stated distinction between the three 
alternative prongs of the “disability” definition was “not tantamount 
to an explicit instruction by Congress that ‘regarded as’ individuals 
are entitled to reasonable accommodations.”212 This argument rings 
hollow for many reasons. The Kaplan court conceded that the 
ADA’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability,” on its 
face, does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of 
the disability definition.213 Even if it is not an “explicit” instruction 
by Congress, a court would need some justification to depart from 
what clearly is the natural application of the disability definition to 
the statute’s prohibition. 
The Ninth Circuit believes it is justified by the “bizarre results” 
that will allegedly result from a “formalistic” reading of the 
statute.214 The Ninth Circuit stated that under such a formalistic 
reading, “impaired employees would be better off under the statute 
if their employers treated them as disabled even if they were not. 
This would be a perverse and troubling result under a statute aimed 
at decreasing ‘stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the 
individual ability of [people with disabilities].’”215 Moreover, the 
court noted that  
were [it] to entitle “regarded as” employees to reasonable 
accommodation, it would do nothing to encourage those 
employees to educate employers of their capabilities, and do 
nothing to encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents 
clearly; instead, it would improvidently provide those employees a 
windfall if they perpetuated their employers’ misperception of a 
disability.216
Looking past the language of the statute should not be necessary 
in the first place, and even if bizarre results were likely, it is not the 
court’s prerogative to fix a law that might be poorly written. 
However, even if one were to engage in such an analysis, the Ninth 
 212. Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000)). 
 216. Id. 
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Circuit’s arguments are unpersuasive. In response to the Kaplan 
court’s concern of “bizarre results,” the Tenth Circuit responded, 
[I]t is in the nature of any “regarded as disabled” claim that an 
employee who seeks protections not accorded to one who is 
impaired but not regarded as disabled does so because of the 
additional component—“regarded as” disabled. This rationale 
provides no basis for denying validity to a reasonable 
accommodation claim.217
The Tenth Circuit also pointed out the flaws in the argument 
that accommodation of perceived disabilities would “do nothing to 
encourage . . . employees to educate employers of their capabilities” 
or to “encourage the employers to see their employees’ talents 
clearly.”218 The Kelly court noted,
[T]he real danger is not that an employee will fail to educate an 
employer concerning her abilities, but that “[t]he employee whose 
limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while [the 
employee regarded as disabled] is sent home unpaid.” That is to 
say, an employer who is unable or unwilling to shed his or her 
stereotypic assumptions based on a faulty or prejudiced perception 
of an employee’s abilities must be prepared to accommodate the 
artificial limitations created by his or her own faulty perceptions. In 
this sense, the ADA encourages employers to become more 
enlightened about their employees’ capabilities, while protecting 
employees from employers whose attitudes remain mired in 
prejudice.219
The approach and arguments of the Tenth, Eleventh, and Third 
Circuits are better aligned to both traditional canons of statutory 
construction as well as the intent of Congress in the ADA. 
Moreover, this approach includes the mentally impaired with their 
physically impaired brothers under the protection of the ADA. As an 
EEOC official observed, “We don’t think twice anymore about curb 
cuts for wheelchairs and Braille on ATMs. But I’m not so sure we’ve 
crossed the frontier on psychiatric disabilities. There’s still so much 
stigma related to the disease.”220 It is time to cross that frontier, and 
 
 217. Kelly v. Metallics W., Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 676 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (quoting Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 
2004)). 
 220. Phillips, supra note 13, at 2275 (quoting Sharon Rennert). 
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the Supreme Court can build the bridge by recognizing “interacting 
with others” as a major life activity and by recognizing an employer’s 
responsibility to accommodate individuals perceived as disabled.  
C. The Splits’ Impact on the Mentally Impaired 
The circuit split on whether “interacting with others” is a major 
life activity under the ADA is a major obstacle to many mentally 
impaired plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination. In addition 
to proving a mental impairment, a plaintiff is not deemed disabled 
for purposes of the ADA unless a court finds that the impairment 
substantially limits at least one major life activity.221 Unfortunately, 
most of the major life activities that courts historically have 
recognized have been directed towards individuals with physical 
disabilities. Therefore, persons suffering from common mental 
impairments like depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia are 
not usually able to argue a substantial limitation in the major life 
activities of walking, seeing, hearing, or breathing. Although clearly 
impaired, the only major life activity in which such individuals may 
claim a limitation is the ability to interact with others. It is hard to 
imagine that Congress did not have such individuals in mind when it 
passed the ADA in 1990. Thus, it is critical to quickly resolve this 
divide, because for individuals suffering from mental impairments, 
such as depression or bipolar disorder, their only avenue for relief 
may depend on a court’s recognition that “interacting with others” 
constitutes a major life activity.222
While the Supreme Court’s recognition of “interacting with 
others” as a major life activity appears to be in line with precedent 
and statutory intent, such a finding by the Court would not, by 
itself, guarantee that mentally impaired individuals will receive 
adequate protection under the ADA. As was briefly discussed in Part 
I, a mentally impaired plaintiff must often face the apparent necessity 
of alleging discrimination based on perceived disabilities. This hurdle 
exists because a mentally impaired person pursuing an “actual 
 
 221. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630–31(1998). 
 222. In addition to having (or being regarded as having) a physical or mental 
impairment, a person is not “disabled” for purposes of the ADA unless that impairment 
substantially limits one or more major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (2000). 
Moreover, unlike the individual confined to a wheelchair who can clearly show she is 
substantially limited with regards to walking, an individual suffering from a mental impairment 
may not appear to be limited in a major life activity. 
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disability” claim must show that she was substantially limited in her 
ability to interact with others.223 This poses problems for such 
plaintiffs because “courts have set the standard for substantial 
limitation in the ability to interact with others in a way that makes it 
difficult for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment.”224 Many courts 
require plaintiffs to show an almost total inability to interact with 
others in order to prove themselves substantially limited in that 
area.225 In fact, “even among courts that accept the ability to interact 
with others as a major life activity, the proof required to establish a 
substantial limitation is so exacting that employees may effectively 
provide employers with the proof needed to establish that the 
employee is not otherwise qualified for the job.”226 Thus, by proving 
the substantial limitation, a plaintiff may provide the employer with 
the necessary ammunition to destroy the impaired plaintiff’s case. If 
they have not done so already, employers will forcefully maintain 
that the ability to interact with others is an essential element to most 
employees’ positions—the very positions that the employees, 
through their proof of substantial limitation, have revealed that they 
cannot adequately perform. 
Some argue that courts should relax the substantial limitation 
standard so that plaintiffs would not have to show an almost absolute 
inability to interact with others.227 Although such a course of action 
would undoubtedly help the plight of mentally impaired plaintiffs, by 
itself it would be insufficient. Such a relaxed standard would still 
require plaintiffs to put forth considerable evidence showing a 
substantial limitation in their ability to interact with others. 
Employers would undoubtedly continue to use this evidence—
 223. See GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 38, § 73:6. 
 224. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1337. 
 225. See Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc, 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that 
even if the court were to recognize interacting with others as a major life activity, Soileau’s 
ability to perform daily chores, visit pubs, and shop at the grocery store showed that his 
impairment did not substantially limit his ability to interact with others); cf. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 
624, 641 (1998) (“[The ADA] addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not 
utter inabilities.”). 
 226. DeLoach, supra note 40, at 1340. 
 227. See id. at 1341–43; see also Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life 
Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1143 
(suggesting that “consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal, or failure to 
communicate when necessary” would set the appropriate standard for a substantial limitation 
requirement (quoting McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 
1999))). 
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though not as damning to plaintiffs as the current standard—as proof 
that the plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job 
and, therefore, does not meet the standard of an “otherwise 
qualified” individual. Even the adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s 
language in McAlindin228 would require plaintiffs to provide an 
enormous amount of ultimately self-destructive evidence. However, 
this is not to say that a relaxed limitation standard would only serve 
as a paper tiger. A more lenient standard could significantly help 
persons with mental impairments that choose to assert “perceived 
disability” claims as opposed to “actual disability” claims. 
Under a “perceived disability” claim, an individual must only 
show that the employer perceived the employee as being substantially 
limited in a major life activity—that is, one’s ability to interact with 
others.229 Since “perceived disability” claims still require a plaintiff to 
show that the employer regarded him as substantially limited in a 
major life activity,230 a relaxed substantial limitation standard would 
appropriately aid deserving plaintiffs while limiting the damaging 
evidence the current standard makes available to the employer. Thus, 
“perceived disability” claims would avoid the problem of requiring 
plaintiffs to submit evidence that undercuts their own claims. 
However, even this framework does not provide the mentally 
impaired with all the necessary protection against discrimination. 
Unless courts recognize a responsibility to reasonably accommodate 
individuals regarded as disabled, a legion of capable individuals with 
disabilities will still be without recourse.231
D. Where Do We Go from Here? 
Given the current landscape of the ADA mountain, with its 
various cracks and crevices in critical places, one might ask, “Where 
do we go from here?” As was noted above, some advocate legislative 
action that would “restore the ADA to its original intent.”232 One 
course of action that can and should be taken is for the Supreme 
 228. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235 (setting the standard for a substantial limitation as 
“consistently high levels of hostility, social withdrawal or failure to communicate when 
necessary”). 
 229. Id. 
 230. See, e.g., id. 
 231. See supra Part III. 
 232. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA 1 (2004), available 
at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2004/righting_ada.htm. 
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Court to mend the circuit splits. Perhaps embedded in the question 
of “Where do we go?” is part of the answer: we must go, we must 
move, we must take action. Dr. Judith A. Cook noted, “The lack of 
employment among consumers of mental health services reflects a 
tremendous loss of productivity and potential for these individuals 
personally and for our society economically.”233 Individuals suffering 
from some sort of mental impairment are growing in number. It is 
clear that the ADA mountain demands the utmost care and 
attention, because like it or not, this mountain casts a wide and 
encompassing shadow.234 The Supreme Court should mend the two 
circuit splits by recognizing “interacting with others” as a major life 
activity and by recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably 
accommodate employees perceived as disabled. Such a resolution of 
these splits is entirely consistent with the plain language of the 
statute and with Congress’s intent in passing this essential legislation. 
Although a proper resolution of the circuit splits is critical to the 
protection and liberation of mentally disabled individuals, such a 
resolution will still leave many such individuals unprotected under 
the ADA.235 One might then ask, “What more can be done?”236 
There are many organizations dedicated to making the goals of the 
ADA a reality, and many have attempted to answer this question. 
The Office of Employment Policy in the Department of Labor has 
“the ultimate goal of increasing the number of people with 
disabilities who work, either as employees or entrepreneurs” and 
provides education, policy analysis, technical assistance, and a variety 
of programs and initiatives to reach this goal.237 The government 
 233. Judith A. Cook, Employment: A Workable Option Despite Mental Illness, 10 
SAMHSA NEWS 1, 1 (2002). 
 234. There are roughly fifty million Americans with disabilities. One current writer wisely 
noted, “Disability is a natural part of human lives. Sooner or later, it will touch most of us.” 
Mary Johnson, A Long Way To Go: Judges and Others Still Don’t Grasp that the 15-Year-Old 
Americans with Disabilities Act Is About Rights, Not Benefits, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 25, 2005, 
at A11. 
 235. This is due to the fact that there are simply some jobs that absolutely require 
interacting with others, and there are some disabilities that cannot be reasonably 
accommodated. 
 236. Many employers might argue nothing more should be done. If an individual is 
incapable of performing the essential functions of a job, with or without accommodation, that 
person may just not be able to make it on the Mountain. This is harsh, but arguably the reality 
of today’s work environment. 
 237. See U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Disability Employment Policy, Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.dol.gov/odep/faqs/main.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2006). 
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currently provides tax incentives for certain employers that 
accommodate employees with disabilities.238 The Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration’s Center for Mental 
Health Services commenced a study seeking to answer the question 
“What do people with psychiatric disabilities need so that they can 
successfully obtain and retain employment?”239 The Job 
Accommodation Network has created an online resource that 
provides suggested accommodations for all types of disabilities.240 
These are but a few of the organizations that are working to 
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Perhaps 
all that is clear is that there is not one answer to the question “What 
more can be done?” 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act is designed to eliminate 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.241 This landmark 
legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified 
individuals with disabilities and requires employers to provide such 
individuals with reasonable accommodations. Since the enactment of 
the ADA, this monumental mountain has become riddled with 
cracks and questions. One major split involves whether interacting 
with others is a major life activity under the ADA. Another 
considerable crack concerns the issue of whether employers have an 
obligation to accommodate employees perceived as disabled. The 
mentally impaired are significantly affected by these two circuit splits. 
First, many mentally impaired individuals can only satisfy the ADA 
“disability” definition by showing that they are substantially limited 
in their ability to interact with others.242 Thus, if a court does not 
 238. See, e.g., Disabled Access Credit, I.R.C. § 44 (2005) (stating tax credit is available 
for small businesses that make their businesses accessible to persons with disabilities). 
 239. The Employment Intervention Demonstration Program (unpublished study) (on file 
with the author). 
 240. See Job Accommodation Network, http://www.jan.wvu.edu (last visited Mar. 1, 
2006). 
 241. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). “[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with 
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and 
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.” Id. § 12101(a)(8). A primary purpose of the 
ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12101(b)(1).  
 242. As discussed above, the majority of major life activities recognized by courts involve 
physical disabilities.  
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recognize “interacting with others” as a major life activity, a mentally 
impaired individual—one that would be viewed as having a disability 
under most colloquial definitions—would not be disabled as defined 
by the ADA and is therefore unprotected under the Act. Even if a 
court recognizes “interacting with others” as a major life activity, a 
mentally disabled individual asserting a “regarded as disabled” claim 
will still lack necessary protection if the court does not recognize an 
employer’s responsibility to accommodate individuals perceived as 
disabled. Consequently, a mentally impaired individual that qualifies 
as “disabled” because he is perceived as substantially limited in his 
ability to interact with others is still denied the right to a reasonable 
accommodation that would allow him to secure a job or continue to 
work. Fortunately for the mentally impaired facing these obstacles, 
the plain language of the ADA, congressional intent, Supreme Court 
precedent, and explicit EEOC guidance all suggest that such 
individuals are protected under the Act.  
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit splits by 
recognizing “interacting with others” as a major life activity and by 
recognizing an employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate 
individuals with perceived disabilities. Such holdings represent the 
most logical interpretation of the ADA and will create a desirable 
unity among the lower courts. Perhaps most important, such a 
course of action is critical for the liberation and protection of many 
individuals suffering from mental illness. However, what is also clear 
is that any hope of realizing a land free of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities will require the creative and collaborative 
problem solving of employees, employers, organizations, agencies, 
governments, and every concerned American. It is argued that “no 
matter how much legislation is passed, attitude changes cannot be 
mandated. This change must come from within.” 243 This may be 
true, but one should not undervalue the law’s influence on societal 
attitudes. The ADA is a monumental mountain worth celebrating, 
and where necessary, mending. 
Matthew M. Cannon 
 243. Francine Bell, Editorial, ADA Brings Quasimodo Out of the Bell Tower, CHI. SUN 
TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A17.  
